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the corporation; the corporation being a creature of the state, it
may prescribe the terms of its existence in the form of a bonus, a
tax for the privilege of exercising its functions in the state, and
that tax, as Judge FIELD says, may be in the form of a tax upon
its loans. But the tax Jaere was not a tax upon the corporation;
it was a tax upon the creditors of the corporation, upon parties
contracting with a corporation at a time when the state which created it had not burdened it with a tax upon its borrowing power,
and was a violation of the obligation of the contract between the
borrower and lender. The shares of stock in the National Banks
are an exception to the rule stated in. this section; the Acts of
Congress as to them annul the general rule and impart to such
shares for some purpose the local character and fixity of real
estate. They are taxed where the bank is situated: Providence
Inst. for Savings &. Jewell v. City of Boston, 101 Mass. 575: Tappan v. Merchants' .Na. Bank, 19 Wall. 490.
W. H.B.
NORFOLK, VA.
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Supreme Court of Errorsof Connecticut.
CHARLES F. BOLLMAN v. CLARK M. LOOMIS.
The policy of the law forbids that a person acting as the friend and confidential adviser of a purchaser, should at the same time be secretly receiving compensation from the seller for effecting the sale ; and a contract for such compensation
is void.

ASSUMpSIT, upon the common counts; brought by appeal from

a justice to the Court of Common 'Pleas of New Haven county.
The following facts were found by the court:
In the latter part of the year 1872, Mrs. W. C. Robinson
called at the store of the defendant to look at pianos which he
kept for sale. She saw there one which pleased her, so far as the
outside appearance was concerned, but not being willing to purchase entirely upon her own judgment, it was suggested that the
plaintiff, who was a friend of F. A. Robinson, a brother of her
husband and an acquaintance of hers, should examine the instrument. The plaintiff was to some extent an expert, and his judgment
was much relied upon by the Robinsons. Before this time the
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plaintiff had been an occasional visitor at the store of the defendant, and was well known to the defendant as an expert. The
plaintiff and F. A. Robinson visited the store of the defendant
together, anid the plaintiff, in the presence of the defendant, examined the piano, and found the tone to be good and the instrument a good one, and so'expressed himself. His opinion was
communicated to Mrs. Robinson. The plaintiff did everything to
this point of time in the utmost fairness and good faith towards
the Robinsons, and gave them the benefit of his unbiased judgment. Mrs. Robinson did not however immediately purchase, and
the plaintiff afterward happening in the store, the defendant asked
him why Mrs. Robinson did not buy the piano. The plaintiff told
him that he did not know, and explained the relation he sustained
toward the Robinsons. The defendant knew that he was acting
for the Robinsons, and that the Robinsons relied upon his judgment, and for this reason he requested him to go further than he had
before gone, and to endeavor to effect a sale, and to urge the piano
upon the Robinsons. This the plaintiff promised to do, and did.
A sale was effected, and the plaintiff's exertions and recommendations were instrumental in effecting it. Neither of the Robinsons
at any time knew that the plaintiff was acting for the defendant,
and the plaintiff acted for the Robinsons merely as a friend, without reward or pay. After the sale was effected the plaintiff demanded payment for his services, and the defendant then denied
that he had ever employed him; but the parties finally settled upon
the sum of $20 as the amount to be paid.
Upon these facts the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff
for $20 damages and his costs, and the defendant brought the
the record before this court by a motion in error.
.Bewtonand Arvine, for the plaintiff in error.
.Bollman, for the defendant in error.
FOSTER, J.-The principle involved in this case is doubtless
of importance; but the amount involved, pecuniarily, is small; so
small, as in our opinion hardly to justify bringing the matter here
to be decided.
There was gross duplicity on the part of the plaintiff in acting
as the confidential friend and adviser of the purchaser of the piano,
and at the same time as agent of the vendor, employed by him
expressly to effect a sale.
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The party proposing to purchase was deceived. Instead of getting, as he supposed he was, the opinion of the plaintiff as an
expert, without bias and without interest, acting merely as a friend,
the plaintiff was in fact acting as the agent of the owner, and
charging fees for his services. A sale having been effected through
his influence, this suit was brought to obtain a compensation.
We think there should be no recovery. We reach this result
not out of any regard for the defendant; he is as fully implicated
in the deception practised on the purchaser as the plaintiff himself. The rule in such cases is, that the law leaves the parties
where it finds them. The transaction was inconsistent with fair
dealing, contrary to sound policy and offensive to good morals.
We do not say that the plaintiff or defendant committed a positive fraud. The plaintiff may have said nothing as to this piano
which he did not believe to be true, and the defendant may have
demanded and obtained for it no more than it was really worth.
But the means.resorted to to effect the sale, deceived the purchaser,
and were in violation of confidence. Such contracts and acts are
deemed equally reprehensible with positive fraud. They are within
the same reason and mischief as contracts made and acts done with
an evil intent, and arc therefore prohibited by law.
Cases of this character, thought differing widely in their details,
are unforunately not rare in courts of justice. In Carterv. Boehm,
8 Burr. 1910, Lord MANSFIELD said: "Good faith forbids either
party, by concealing what he privately knows, to draw another
into a bargain from his ignorance of that fact and his believing
the contrary." In Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Yes. 155, s. c. 1
Atk. 352, Lord HARDWICKE said: "Fraud may be collected or
inferred, in the consideration of a court of equity, from the nature
and circumstances of the transaction, as being an imposition and
deceit on other persons, not parties to the fraudulent agreement."
In -uller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 481, Chief Justice SHAw said: "The
law avoids contracts and promises made with a view to place one
under wrong influences; those which offer him a temptation to do
that which may affect injuriously the rights and interests of third
persons." And again : "If such advice and solicitation, thus
understood to be pure and disinterested, may lbe justly offered
from mercenary motives, they would produce all the consequences
of absolute misrepresentation and falsehood."
This case comes within a class of cases described in the books
as "poundage for recommending customers to buy." The case of
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Wyiburd v. &anton, 4 Esp. 179, is directly in point. That was
an action of assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. " The plea
was the general issue and set-off. One part of the set-off was for
certain poundage and reward before that time agreed to be paid,
and then due and payable from the plaintiff to the defendant, upon
and in respect of certain goods and merchandise before that time
sold and delivered by the plaintiff to one Andrew, for and in consideration of the defendant's having recommended the said Andrew
to buy the said goods and merchandise from the plaintiff. Upon
this being stated, Lord ELLENBOROUGH said he thought this demand could not be supported. It was a fraud on third persons.
It was accordingly rejected.
We think this principle a salutary one, and applicable to this
case. There is therefore manifest error in the judgment below.
There is no principle of the law of
contracts of more vital force than that
which requires that the same party shall
not be interested or act, either as principal or agent, upon both sides. It is
but the adoption and enforcement of that
fundamental rule of Christian ethics,
"ye cannot serve two masters." The
rule extends to a large number of those
legal relations, resting upon confidence,
trust and dependence upon one side, and
advice, direction, superiority and control
upon the other. Thus an agent will not
be allowed to buy or sell for his principal, of any corporation or joint stock
company in which the agent is interested, without acquainting his principal
with all the facts known to himself, and
allowing him to judge for himself, the
principal being of full age and competency to act understandingly and prudently: Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl. & Cr.
139. So one cannot make a binding
contract where he acts as the agent of
both parties: N. Y. CentralIns. Co. v.
Nat. Protection Ins. Co., 20 Barb. 470,
where the cases are very extensively
cited and judiciously analyzed byMAsoN,
J. And in the very recent case of Raisin
v. Clark, 41 Md. 158, the court held
that a real estate broker, who was employed to sell a property, and effected

an exchange for other real estate, could
not charge the owner of the latter a commissin. The law does not permit the
broker in such case to act as agent of
both parties even by expresb agriement.
Such an agreement would not be enforced ; and a custom of brokers to receive a half commission from each
party in an exchange, was held void as
against a settled principle of law.
So the trustee cannot become interested in the purchase of any portion of
the trust estate : Parkhtrst v. Alexander, i Johns. Ch. 394 And the purchase of any portion of the bankrupt estate by the assignee will be treated as a
trust for the benefit of the creditors: Ex
parte Laecey, 6 Ves. 625. And the same
rule will extend to executors and administrators, and to all persons acting
as trustees for sale. And the surety is
not allowed to purchase the debt for his
own benefit, but it will enure to the benefit of the principal debtor: Reed v.
Norris, 2 Myl. & Cr. 374. So an agent
who discovers a defect in the title to
land of his principal cannot procure
the itle for himself: Ringo v. Binns,
10 Pet. (U. S.) 269. The principle of
these cases is now universally recognised. It is very learnedly discussed by
two eminent English chancellors, in the
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House of Lords, TnURLOW and LouGHnonouou, in the early and leading case
of York Building Co. v. ,3fackenzie, S
British Parl. Cases, in App. ; 3 Paton
378. The rule extends to directors in
Joint stock corporations, so that they
cannot legally derive any personal benefit from any of their transactions on
behalf of the company: Great Luxembourg By. v. Magnay, 25 Beav. 588; 4
Jur. N. S. 839. A director cannot recover for work erected for the benefit of
the company, if he was himself interested in the contract: Stears v. Southend
Gas Light ti Coke Co., 9 C. B. N. S.
180; 7 Jur. N. S. 447.
The rule extends to the avoiding of
all contracts procured lty taking advantage of the relation of attorney and client: Corley v. Lord tafford, I De Gex
& Jones 238; Hobday v. Peters, 6 Jur.
N. S. 794; 8 W. R. 512. The bnrden,
in all cases between attorney and client,
is upon the attorney to show that the
transaction was entirely equal and fair:
Lyddon v. Moss, 5 Jur. N. S. 635;
Morgan v. Higgins, 1 Gif. 270. All
securities between attorney and client
are presumptively void. The burden
rests upon the attorney to support them:
Brown Y. Budkley, 1 McCarter 457.

We need not here pursue this question
further. The elementary books and the
reports abound in wise rules and'much
beautiful moralizing upon them. The
rule is even more stringent as between
trustee and cestui que trust, than between
attorney and client, where we have seen
it is only required to show the transaction fair; but in the former case the
same is equally void, at the election of
cesftui que trust, even where it appears
that no advantage was taken: Cane v.
LordAllen, 2 Dow 289. Ld. BUOUGHAW,
Chancellor, in Hunter v. Atkins, 3 Myl.
& K. 113, puts the case of attorney and
client upon the same ground, and we see
no reason for any distinction in the
cases. But, as we said, after much beautiful moralizing, we fear this very avenue to fraud and corruption is one that
it will be found, practically, most difficult to close up. Mere rules of law, or
morality, seem to act as a kind of compensation in the minds of too many in
our day, perhaps in all times, for giving
more or less countenance to exceptional
iniquities, upon the principle that all
rules must and will have some exceptions, till the latter overbalance and
outnumber the former.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of .Errors of Connecticut.
HUNGERFORD'S APPEAL FROM PROBATE.
A former recovery, to become a bar, must be for the same cause of action, but,
not necessarily in the sameform of action.

THIS was a claim presented to the commissioners by the appellant as bllows:
"Estate of R. D. Hicks to Dana L. Hungerford, Dr.
"February 1st 1870, to my services in your business, endeavoring to sell the Clark House in Winsted, from the
1st day of December 1869, to the 1st day of February
$1900."
1870, and cash expenses in said business,
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The appellant offered evidence, and proved, that between the
3d day of December 1869, and the 9th of February 1870, he devoted several days of his time in the service of Hicks, during his
lifetime, in endeavoring to sell a hotel owned by Hicks in the town
of Winsted, called the Clark House, which services were worth .10
per day, and that during the time be expended in necessary expenses in the business the sum of $75.
He further offered evidence, and proved, that on the 3d day of
December 1869, he entered into the following written contract
with Hicks:
"Winsted, Conn., Dec. 3d 1869. Whereas D. L. Hungerford
has proposed to find some person or persons who will purchase my
hotel, called the Clark House, in Winsted: Now I do hereby agree
that if he shall find or send any person or persons wl:o will purchase said property at any terms to which I may assent, and I
shall thereupon make the sale to such person or persons, I will
pay him, the said D. L. Hungerford, as a compensation for his services in the matter, the sum of $1000, when said sale is effected.
R. D. HIcKs."
In connection therewith he offered evidence to prove that Hicks,
in the latter part of December 1869, or in the first part of January 1870, sold the Clark House to ore Dennis W. Stevens, and
after the sale concealed the fact from the appellant, and said to
the latter "you are doing well, go on and make a noise about the
property; it must be sold before the 1st of April." And that,
from this time, which was the il3th of January 1870, the appellant
continued his efforts to find a purchaser for the property, until the
7th day of February 1870, during which time he expended considerable sums of money in the matter.
The appellee claimed that the appellant was barred of a recovery for his services and expenses by reason of a judgment heretofore rendered by the Superior Court between the parties (which
case came to the Supreme Court and is reported in 39 Conn. Rep.
259), but the appellant claimed that he ought not to be barred by
that judgment, as it was rendered solely upon the question whether
he was, entitled to recover the sum of $1000 by virtue of the
written contract, and the appellant claimed that the court, in proceeding to and rendering the judgment, did so entirely upon the
written contract, and that he did not offer any evidence or make
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any elaim to recover for the services and expenses now claimed by
hiii, a ,dthat the court did not pass upon his present claim, and
in proof of this he offered in evidence the record and files in that
ca1se. The record showed that the declaration in that action contained a special count upon the written contract above stated, and
for money expended, and
a gencral count for work and labor, a,,,d
that -thejudgment wns a general judgment for the defendant.
The court was of opinion and decided that the appellant was
barred from recovering upon his present claim for services and expenses by reason of the judgment, and thereupon rendered judginent for the appellee. The appellant filed a motion for a new
trial for error in this ruling of the court.
P. L. Hunger ford (with whom was Graves and Miorrilo, in support of the motion.
.litcheock, contra.-The claim sought to be enforced in this
proceeding is res adjudicata. The case of ifungerford v. Ricks,
39 Conn. 259, was tried in the Superior Court. It was an action
of assumpsit, embracing a special count founded on a special contract, and counts for work and labor, and for money laid out and
expended for the defendant at his special instance and request. To
this action Hicks pleaded the general issue. So the parties were
at issue on the question, whether or not Ilungerford had any
honest claim against Hicks for labor done and performed, or for
money laid out and expended for him at his request. And that
is the very issue involved in this proceeding between the same
parties.
We say, therefore, that in the declaration in the action of assumpsit, between these same parties, Hungerford had appropriate
counts for this claim; that he there declared that Hicks was indebted to him for work and labor, and for money laid out and expended ; that Hicks by his plea denied this; that the parties were
thus legally and fairly at issue as to whether Hungerford had any
such claim against Hicks; that Hlungerford introduced proof to
satisfy the court of the truth of this claim ; that the court rendered
judgment, generally, against Hungerford; and that Hungerford
moved for a new trial, on the ground that the Superior Court did
not render judgment in his favor on this identical claim, under the
common counts in his declaration. Is not, therefore, this claim
res adjudienta? "-Parties will not be permitted to litigate what
Vet.. XXIV.-I I
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they once had an opportunity of litigating in the course of a judicial proceeding; but whatever might have been put in issue in that
proceeding shall be concluded to have been put in issue and determined :" McDowall v. McDowrall, 1 Bailey's Eq. Rep. 324.
PARDEE, J.-It is a well-settled principle of law that whenever
a court of competent jurisdiction has judicially tried and determined
a right or a fact, the judgment thereon, so long as it remains unreversed, shall be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity
with them in law or estate.
This trial and determination must be upon pleadings wherein is
an averment of a fact precisely stated on one side and traversed
on the other, and found by the court orijury affirmatively or negatively in direct terms, and not by way of inference. Such a result
would be obtained where an issue is reached by special pleading;
rarely, when the general counts in a declaration are met by a
general denial.
In our modern practice it is usual to insert several general
counts in a declaration : and when the general issue is pleaded to
these many different claims may be tried. When upon pleadings
thus framed a general judgment is rendered, and is thereafter
pleaded in bar, it is yrimd facie evidence of a prior adjudication
of every demand which might have been drawn into controversy
under it; but, like other prividfacie evidence, it may be met and
controlled by other competent evidence tending to show that any
particular demand or claim was not presented or considered : Saw.yer v. TVoodbury, 7 Gray 499.
In Kennedy v. Scovil, 14 Conn. 68, this court said, that, "in
,order to constitute a former judgment an estoppel, or in other
-ords, to render it conclusive on any matter, it is necessary that
it should appear that the precise point was in issue and decided;
and this should appear from the record itself." And, in Dickinson v. Rayes, 31 Conn. 423, the court say: "1Where two or more
,distinct causes of action are sued for in the same declaration and
'here is a general verdict and judgment for the plaintiff or a judgment for him on default, the record of such judgment is not conclusive evidence that both or all of those causes of action have been
passed upon or adjudicated. Thus, in Seddon v. Tutop, 6 Term
Rep. 607, the plaintiff sued upon a promissory note and also for
goods sold. The defendant suffered judgment by default, and
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upon executing the writ of inquiry, the plaintiff being unprepared
with evidence regarding the goods, took his verdict and judgment
for the note only. In a subsequent action for the goods it was
held that the judgment in the first suit was no bar to the plaintiff's
recovery in the second, and that the plaintiff was at liberty to prove
what took place at the first trial for the purpose of showing that
his 'verdict and judgment then, did not include the price of the
goods sued for now."
Tile right of the appellant to recover $1000 from Hicks upon
the special contract may have been the issue which was tried and
determined in the original suit ; the same is true of his right to
recover the reasonable value of his services upon the direction of
Hicks to "go on and make a noise about the property;" also, of
his right to recover for money laid out and expended for and at
the request of Hicks i the record, showing merely a general judgment for Hicks, leaves it wholly uncertain, without other evidence,
whetlher or not the right of the appellant to recover the claim
which he has presented to the commissioners was put in issue, tried
and determined in that suit.
Upon these principles, the record in question cannot be deemed
conclusive for the purpose for which it was offered in evidence.
The appellant is entitled to the privilege of showing that the claim
which he now presents was not put in issue, tried or determined in
the original suit
There is error in the judgment complained of,and it is reversed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
It seems to be well settled, as a general rule, that a former recovery for the
same cause of action, is to be regarded
as an equitable defence, and need not
be specially pleaded under th, old rule
of pleading, requiring estoppels by record to be specially pleaded, under penalty of being regarded as waived by
the party: Stafford v. Clark, 2 Bing.
277: Gray v. Pingry, 17 Vcrm. 419423. A former recovery for the same
cause of action is as much an equitable
defence as payment or accord and satisfaction, and no more subject to any
special stringency in pleading.
And we may here state that by the
same cause of action is not implied

always that each particular of the items
of the former recovery, and the present
action, shall be precisely identical. As
one entire cause of action cannot be so
subdivided as to maintain separate actions upon the different items, it follows
that if the former judgment embraces
any of the items in the present action,
it will be a bar to the subsequent suit.
Thus a conviction for a common assault
will bar any future prosecution for the
same assault, with intent to kill, or to
commit rape: Re Thompson, 9 IV. R.
203. This point was involved to some
extent in the recent English case-We
in!les V. oTpkins, 23 W. I. 691 ; L. I.
i0 Q. B. 378-where a prosecution ua-

""
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der one statute was held to be a bar to
another for the same offence, although
in a different form and under a different
statute. This view is decisive of the
only, question actually raised in the
principal case.
The dictum, that where the former
adjudication is relied upon as an estoppel in regard to particular facts, it must
appear by the record in the former action that such facts were in issue and directly passed upon, and the estoppel must
be so pleaded, is well settled: Vooght
v. Winch, 2 B. & AId. 668 ; Outram v.
Morewood, 3 East 345 ; tHopkins v. Lee,
6 Wheaton 109; Fairinan v. Bacon, 8
Conn. 418; Gray v. Pingry, supra.
It is said in some eases that where
the question was, in fact, determined in
the former action, but that does not appear upon the record, and where'of
course it cannot be pleaded as an estoppel of record, it may nevertheless be

given in evidence in any subsequent ac.
tion between the same parties, where
the same facts are involved, and will
have such weight as the triers choose to
give it: I-ooght v. Winch, supra; Outram
v. forewood, Gray v. Pingry, sapra.
The precise effect of such a new finding,
when acted upon in a subsequent action,
seems not well settled. Our own views
were expressed in the case last cited,
and need not be repeated.
And it is
well settled that a judgment-bond upon
specific recitals upon the record will
not, as matter of course, prove such recitas to the full extent, but only so far
as is requisite to uphold the judgment :
.Bnrlen v. Shannon, 99 Mass. 200; Phil.
Ev., ch. 2, . 2; Hotcliiss v. Nichols, 3
Day 138; Ooit v Tracy, 8 Conn. 266 ;
where it is said: "Facts found by a
former decree, which were not necessary
to uphold the decree, do not conclude
I. F. R.
the parties."
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ABIGAIL HANFORD v. HARVEY FITCH

AND

OTHERS.

The petitioner in 1820, then a married woman, joined with her husband in mortgaging for his debt a piece of land owned by ter, soon after which she removed
with her husband from the state, and they continued to reside out of the state until
1869, when lie died.

Immediately after the execution of the mortgage, C., a cred-

itor of the husband, attached his life-interest as tenant by the curtesy in the laud,
and afterwards had it set off to him in part satisfaction of the judgment which he
obtained. In 1822, C. purchased the mortgage interest, taking a quit-claim of the
land from the mortgagee, and three months after he conveyed the land by a warranty deed to a purchaser, from whom by sundry conveyances the land came in
different parcels to the respondents. The land was originally of little value,
unfitted for cultivation or for building purposes, hut the respondents had at great
expense graded and erected houses and other buildings upon it. At the time C.
made the conveyance lie was in actual possession of the land, but it did not appear
when he took possession.nor whether under his mortgage title or that derived from
the levy of his execution. No interest upon the mortgage debt was ever paid by
the petitioner or her husband, nor was any attention given by either of them to
the property before his death.
After his death, the petitioner inquired about the
property and demanded possession, which being refused she brought a bill in
equity to redeem. Held, 1. That if C. was to be regarded as having taken possession under the levy of his execution the petitioner would not be barred by the
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Statute of Limitations. 2. But that, in the absence of any evidence on the subject, and after so great a lapse of time, the court would presume that he had
abandoned his claim under the levy and had taken possession as mortgagee. 3.
That his possession as mortgagee, and that of those deriving title from him, being
adverse to the petitioner, %he would be barred by the Statute of Limitations.
(Two judges dissenting.)
A married woman who executes a mortgage of her land with her husband, is not

saved by her coverture from the running of the Statute of Limitations against her
title in favor of the mortgagee.

BILL to redeem mortgaged premises and to remove a cloud from
a title; brought to the Superior Court in Fairfield county. The
following facts were found by a committee:
In 1812, the petitioner was married to one Zalmon Hanford,
with whom she lived thereafter till his death, which took place in
1869. There was issue of the'marriage born alive, and capable
of inheriting the property hereinafter mentioned.
In 1818, the land in question was conveyed to the petitioner
by David and Silas 0. Lockwood, who were the lawful owners of
the same. The consideration for the conveyance was the sum of
$550, which was paid out of the proceeds of a prior sale of real
estate belonging to the petitioner, and which she had inherited
from her rhother.
On March 14th 1820, Zalmon Hanford was indebted to Eli B.
Bennett of Norwalk, by his promissory note of that date, in the
sum of $224.08, payable on demand, with interest, the consideration
of which was dry goods, groceries and provisions, before that time
sold by Bennett to Hanford, as supplies for his family; and to
secure the payment of the note, the petitioner and said Zalmon
on that day executed and delivered to Bennett a mortgage of the
land in question, which was on the same day recorded in Norwalk.
Very soon after the execution of the mortgage, the petitioner
and her husband left Norwalk, and went to reside in the state of
New York, where they lived about thirteen years, and then removed
to Ohio, where they remained until about the year 1843, and then
removed to the state of Illinois, where they resided till his death,
and where the petitioner still resides.
Neither the petitioner nor her husband ever had any actual possession of the land after their removal from Norwalk, and Bennett
never took possession. At the time of their removal it had been
cultivated only to a limited extent, and no buildings had been
erected upon it.
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On the 14th of March 1820, said Zalmon was indebted to one
Samuel Cannon of Norwalk, by his promissory note for $100,
which was executed and dated December 9th 1815, and on said
14th of March 1820, Cannon commenced a suit upon the note, by
a writ of attachment, which was served by attaching all the right
and interest of said Zalmon in the land in question ; the attachment being subsequent to Bennett's mortgage. The writ was
returnable to the county court for Fairfield county at its April
Term 1820, at which term Cannon recovered judgment by default
against said Zalmon for $114.20 damages and $9.70 costs; on
which judgment execution was taken out in due form, and on the
19th of August 1820, levied on his interest in the land, which
was appraised at $55.92, and the same was set off in favor of Cannon, in part satisfaction of the execution; and the execution, with
the endorsement of the officer's doings thereon, was, on the 29th
day of August 1820, duly ieturned to court. There was no evidence that the execution was ever recorded by the clerk of the
court, unless the same was to be implied from the facts found;
and if, in the opinion of the court, the recording was to be inferred
from the facts found, then the recording was found as a fact,
otherwise not.
Cannon entered into possession of the land at some time between
the levy of the execution and 18th June 1822, but the evidence
did not enable the committee to fix the date of his taking possession, nor the title or claim of title under which he entered
into possession, unless the same could be implied from the facts
found.
On March 18th 1822, said Bennett gave to Cannon a quit-claim
deed of that date, of the land mortgaged to him by the petitioner
and said Zalmon. The consideration paid by Cannon to Bennett
for the deed was $244.81. The amount then due on the mortgage-note was $251.11. Upon the payment of the consideration,
the mortgage-note was delivered to Cannon, with the quit-claim
deed, but the mortgage was not delivered, and no other writing or
assignment was made between Bennett ;and Cannon. At the time
of this transaction nothing had been paid on the mortgage-note,
either upon the principal or as interest, and Bennett had not asked
payment from Cannon, nor taken any Steps towards collecting the
note or the foreclosing of the mortgage. Cannon's intention and
object in the transaction with Bennett was not to pay off and extin-
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guish the mortgage, but to purchase and hold it as a subsisting
cfnunbrahice on the land.
On June 18th 1822, by warranty deed of that date, Cannon
conveyed all his interest in the land to one Samuel Gray, who
entered into possession of the same. Gray occupied the premises
until the 17th of January 1824, when he purchased of one Marvin
an.additional tract of .land, containing about one acre, adjoining
the land in question on the south and west; and on the 27th of
April 1827, he conveyed the entire tract of land, as thus enlarged,
by warranty deed of the (late, to Esther Hubbell, of Norwalk, from
whom the tame has come through a largenumber of intermediate
holders and possessors, and by numerous and an unbroken succession of deeds, maiialy of warranty, and all duly. recorded at or
about the times of their respective dates, into the several possession and occupancy of the respondents; all of whom purchased
and now hold their re-pective portions of the land under a bond fide
claim of title. In so much of the land now occupied by the respondents, as was embraced in tie original deed from David and
Silas C. Lockwood to the petitioner, the respondents have no.title,
except such as they may derive through Cannon's deed to Gray,
and the subsequent conveyances referred to, and such as they may
derive from the occupancy of the premises, under the facts and
circumstances found.
No payment of interest or principal, or any part thereof, has
ever been made on tie mortgage-debt, and there is no record or
other evidence that the mortgage has ever been foreclosed. The
question whether such foreclosure may be presumed from the lapse
of time and the facts found, was submitted by the committee to the
court.
After the deed from Cannon to Gray, of June 18th 1822, no
reference has ever been made in any of the subsequent deeds
through which the respondents claim title, to the Bennett mortgare.
If tie court should consider the Bennett mortgage as a still subsistintg encumbrance on the land, then the comnittee found the
amount due on the mortgage, computing interest tohe 14th day
of March 1874, to be the sum of $950.09. The petitioner never
requiested a reconveyance of the legal title which passed by the
mortgage, from any one, till the 6th (lay of October 1870, when
she requested the respondents severally to release to her, by suita-
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ble deeds, the legal title to the premises held by them respectively,
which they severally refused to do.
The petitioner never asserted any claim of interest in the land
until some time in the summer of 1869, after the death of her
husband, nor were any of the respondents in any way informed
of her claim of an interest' in the premises until they received
notice from her present attorneys, in the fall of 1870, a very short
time before the petition -was served.
The several respondents purchased their respective interests in
the premises, for full consideration, in good fiith, without any
notice or suspicion of afiy adverse claim or interest therein on the
part of the petitioner, or of any person or persons. The records
of lands, however, in the town of Norwalk, disclosed the state of
the title to the premises, and such notice as the law implies from
this fact the respondents had, but no actual notice.
At the time of its purchase by Gray the land was very rough
and barren, and poorly adapted to either agricultural or building
purposes. Since that time the respondents, and various prior
occupants, in good faith, without notice of any claim or interest
on the part of the petitioner in the premises, and in the belief on
their part that they held perfect titles to the fee of the land, have
at great expense made many improvements on the land by grading,
draining and enriching the soil, and by setting out trees and
shrubbery, and have also erected four dwelling-houses, with outbuildings and fences, which the respondents now occupy as their
homesteads.
Upon these facts the case was reserved for the advice of this
court.
L. Warner and TWoodward, for the petitioner.
Smith (with -whom was Beardsley), for respondents.
PARK, 0. J.-The petitioner seeks, by force of a mere technical
right, to recover the possession of premises which have become of
great value by reason of improvements m'rde upon them, while it
is evident that she abandoned all her interest in them nearly fifty
years ago. During all this period she has paid no interest on the
note which the mortgage of her property was given to secure, nor
has she looked after the property, or showed any interest in it.
She has done nothing whatsoever indicating an intention ever to
redeem the mortgage until recently, and it is manifest that her
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desire to do so now is wholly owing to the great advance of the
property in value since the mortgage was given.
The claim of the petitioner is based upon the assumption that
Cannon, the execution-creditor, went into the actual possession of
the life-estate under and by virtue of the execution :hich was
levied in his favor on the life-estate of Zalmon Hanford, the late
husband of the petitioner, and that both he and the parties claiming under him continued to hold possession of the land, under the
execution-levy, during the life of Zalmon Hanford. If this was
so in fact, then the prayer of the petitioner should be granted.
But if such was not the case, if Cannon never took possession
of the land under the levy of his execution, but abandoned the
interest lie acquired by the levy, and some two years subsequently
went into the actual possession of the land under the mortgage
interest which lie had purchased, and claimed the entire property
as his own under such purchase, and possessed it accordingly, and
this possession was continued by. the parties claiming the land
under him, then the right of the petitioner has long since been
extinaguished.
Whether the one state of facts or the other existed in this case,
is the question we have to determine.
It appears in the case that for nearly half a century the land in
question has been held by absolute deeds; that during this peri6d
it has passed from grantor to grantee through many conveyances,
the grantor in nearly every instance warranting the title in fee to
his immediate successor; that the parties to these conveyances
purchased the land in good faith, without notice of any claim
whatever to it on the part of the petitioner; that the land was
barren originally, and was poorly adapted to agriculture; that it
has been divided into building lots, and has been graded, drained
and enriched at great expense; that trees and shrubbery have
been set out and other improvements made upon it; and that
dwelling-houses, out-buildings and fences, have been erected upon
it. Thus it appears that, during this long period of time, parties
in possession of the land have constantly exercised acts of absolute
ownership over it, and unless some unsurmountable obstacle prevents
the running of the Statute of Limitations against the petitioner's
claim, the case is one of the strongest character going to show
that the statute has long since extinguished her interest.
The only difficulty in the case arises from the fact that Cannon
VOL. XXIV.-12
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levied his execution on the life-estate of Zalmon Hanford, and
had it set off in part satisfaction of his debt, but whethr he ever
went into possession of the laud under his levy, or claimed anything whatsoever from it, does not appear. It is found that he
levied his execution, and there the finding leaves the maiter. It
is true that he was in possession of the land on the 18th day of
June 1822, nearly two years after the levy of his execution, but it
is also true that three months previous to that time he purchased
an outstanding mortgage on the entire property, and reecivei1 a
quit-claim deed of the same, which conveyed to him the legal title
to the property. This accounts for his possession at that time,
while there is an indication that his possession was under his (juitclaim deed, in the fact that on that day he gave an absolute deed
of the entire property, and warranted the title to his grantee.
There is nothing going to show any previous possessionI under
the levy of the execution except the presumption of 1aw that a
party is in possession of land which he owns unless it apnears to
be in the actual possession of another. But this presumlptihin has
no reference to actual- possession.
It relates to co structive
possession merely, and the rule was established for the benefit
of the owner.
Nothing therefore appears in the case to show that Cannon ever
in fact took or held possession of the land under his execution
title, and the burden is bn the petitioner to show that it wa. so
held in order to avoid the running of the Statute of Limitations
against her claims.
The life-estate was of little or no value at the time of the levy
of the execution, and there could have been but little object in
keeping it alive. The land was barren, and poorly adapted to
agriculture, and it is manifest that the life-estate was not valuable
for any other purpose. It required great expense to grade it for
building purposes, and no man would think of incurring the
expense necessarily attending the erection of buildings on the land
when it was held by so precarious a tenure. The life-estate might
terminate at any moment and valuable improvements consequently
would be lost.
And furthermore, at the time that Cannon went into possession
of the property under his mortgage interest, the entire property
was not worth the amount of the mortgage, for he purchased it at
less than the amount. The mortgage covered the entire property,
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and was the first encumbrance on it, and it is unreasonable to suppose that the owner of the mortgage would have sold it for less
than the amount of the mortgage-debt if the land was of greater
value than the mortgage. It is therefore fair to presume that the
life-estate in the hands of Cannon was of no value when he went
into possession of the land under his mortgage interest. This accounts for his not going into possession of the property under the
levy of his execution. It accounts too for his conveying the property by a deed of warranty, for he considered his mortgage-deed
as equivalent to an absolute deed of the property, inasmuch as it
represented its entire value.
We think therefore that the case shows that Cannon abandoned
his levy for the benefit of the petitioner, and we may presume from
the great length of time that the property has been held by parties
in possession of the land, as absolute owners, that he quit-claimed
to her all his interest acquired by the levy, and afterwards went
into possession of the land under his mortgage-deed: Similar presumptions are made in cases of landlord and tenant, where the
tenant and parties claiming the land under him have for many
years occupied the land as absolute owners. The law presumes in
such cases that the tenant surrendered the tenancy to his landlord
together with the possession of the property, and subsequently
ousted him of the possession. It was so held by this court in the
case of Camp v. Camp, 5 Conn. 291. In that case a tenant at
will remained, after the death of the landlord, in the exclusive and
uninterrupted possession of the land, claiming it as his own, for a
period of fifty-seven years. It was held by the court, that although as a general rule a tenant is estopped to deny the title of
his landlord, and although a person once a tenant will primdfacie
be deemed to continue in that character so long as he remains in
possession of the land demised, yet it is competent for such person
to show that the relation has been dissolved. And it was further
held that, from the long period of time that the property had been
adversely held, the jury were authorized to presume a restoration
of the land to the heirs of the lessor, and afterwards an ouster of
them, thereby dissolving the relation which at first subsisted.
The analogy of this case to the present one is apparent. There
can be but little difference in principle, so far as the present question is concerned, between a tenant for life and a tenant for years.
Acts of absolute ownership are as much inconsistent with the one
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as with the other, and if in the one case, where such acts have
been long continued, the jury may be warranted in finding that the
property had been surrendered to the landlord, and an ouster afterward committed, so may the presumption we have stated be warranted in the case at bar.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Willison v. Walkins, 3 Pet. 43, says: "It is an undoubted principle
of law fully recognised by this court, that a tenant cannot dispute
the title of his landlord, by setting up a title either in himself or
in a third person, during the existence of the lease or tenancy.
* * * The same principle applies to mortgagor and mortgagee,
trustee and eestui que trust, and generally to all cases where one
man obtains possession of real estate belonging to another by a
recognition of his title. On all these subjects the law is too well
settled to require illustration or reasoning or to admit of a doubt.
But we do not think that in any of these relations it has been
adopted to the extent contended for in this case, which presents a
disclaimer by a tenant with the knowledge of his landlord, and an
unbroken possession for such length of time that the act of limitation has run out four times before be has done any act to assert
his right to the land. Had there been a formal lease for a term
not then expired, the lessee forfeited it by this act of hostility ;
had it been a lease at will from year to year, he was entitled to no
notice to quit before an ejectment. The landlord's action would
be as against a trespasser, as much so as if no relation bad ever
existed between them." This ease is a strong one on the point
we are considering. The court say: "Had there been a formal
lease for a term not then expired, the lessee forfeited it by this act
of hostility ;" that is, the assumption of absolute ownership of the
property would forfeit a lease executed with all the forms of law
and cause the premises to revert to the landlord, who might immediately treat his former tenant as a trespasser.
This case goes farther, perhaps, than our own courts would be
prepared to go. We should, probably, have applied to the case
the doctrine of Camp v. Carnq, and have held that the disclaimer,
taken in connection with the aIverse possession of the premises,
finding a surrender of the
was sufficient to warrant the jtin
tenancy to the landlord and an ouster afterwards. See also
.Blight- Lessee v. Boahester, 7 Whea l 535; Adams on Ejectment
118; Ball. N. P. 96.
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We think therefore that the life-estate of Zalmon Hanford terminated in the manner we have supposed when Cannon went into
possession of the land under his mortgage-deed ; and that consequently there was nothing afterwards to prevent the running of
the Statute of Limitations against the petitioner's claim, for the
law is well settled that a mortgagee may hold land adversely so
that his possession will eventually ripen into an absolute title:
Bunce v. Wolcott, 2 Conn. 27; Jarvi8 v. Woodruff, 22 Conn.
548.
The conclusion we have come to in the case is clearly equitable.
The petitioner had ample notice from the acts of the parties holding the land, that they were not holding it under the levy of the
execution, but in their own right as absolute owners, and for nearly
fifty years she appears to have acquiesced in the right and to have
abandoned her equity of redemption.
In coming to the conclusion at which we have arrived, we have
not overlooked the fact that the petitioner, until the year 1869,
was a married woman. If it were an ordinary case of adverse possession of her land, her coverture would save her from the application of the Statute of Limitations. But we think that a wife
who joins ,ith her husband in a mortgage of her land is not protected by her coverture from the ordinary effect of the adv6rse possession of the mortgagee. This adverse possession is not strictly
against the legal title of the mortgagors ; for, as between himself
and them, he has the legal title, and they have as against him no
right of entry to be barred ; but the adverse possession is against
the equitable right of the mortgagors to redeem, so that a court of
equity in holding their right to redeem to be barred by the lapse
of time, is merely applying an equitable limitation, in analogy to
the Statute of Limitations at law, and we regard it as equitable
that the wife, who has voluntarily placed herself in the position of
a mortgagor, should be held to have accepted all the usual conditions and incidents of the position, and that her right to-redeem is
lost in equity when there has been such a lapse of time as would
in equity bar the right of an ordinary mortgagor to redeem. We
think, too, that, in view of the tendency of our legislation as well
as of the decisions of the courts throughout the country, to recognise the separate rights of married women with regard to their property, and their power to control the same, our courts should lean
towards an enlargement of their responsibility and duty with re-
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gard to their property, and a curtailment of those exemptions and
privileges that were given to married women as an offset for their
want of power.
We advise the Superior Court to dismiss the petition.
In this opinion CARPENTER and
and PARDEE, JJ., dissented.

PHELPS,

JJ., concurred.
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The question, whether *a party has nte : Baker v. W~ashington, 5 Stew.
title to a certain estate, as an entire (Ala.) 142 ; Tetharn v. Young, I Port.
question, is one of fact, although its (Ala.) 298, and it is not so constituted
solution may depend on law, and if an by statite in Connecticut. And this is
appellant would have the case reviewed,
the onlIy act of Cannon which can be
he must have the findings such that the considered as approaching to notice of
matters of fact, which raise the question .adverse possession.
of law involved, shall be fully settled :
But if this hypothesis, which depends
for its support upon the' presumption
Farnham v. Hotchkiss. 1 Abb. (N. Y.)
App. Dec. 93. But the petitioner is not that the execution was recorded by the
obliged to present proof of facts which clerk of the court, cannot be maintained,
are presumed by law: Dugas v. Estiletts, there still remains a more difficult ques5 La. Ann. 560 ; Davenport v. Mason, tion to answer, namely the petitioner's
5 Mass. 85 ; Baalam v. State, 17 Ala. coverture until 1869. In Connecticut
451. And it is a presumption of law it has !been held that title by adverse
that the owner is in possession of his possession cannot be acquired against a
married woman during coverture: Gage
own, and it is also a presumption of
law, that the levy of attachment was, v. Smith, 27 Conn. 70; Watson v. lVatafter being returned by the officer, duly son, 10 Id. 77. And it has been very
recorded by the clerk, for which precise generally held, in nearly all the states
condition we are unable to find any pre- of the union, that the Statute of Limitacedent ; still if the record by the clerk tions does not bigin to run against a
which it was his duty to make, may be married woman while she is covert:
presumed to have been made, then Can- Sedyv. Clopton, 6 Ala. 589 ; Miclau v.
TT"gatt, 21 Id. 813; W ilson v. h1ilson,
non, the party under whom the respond36 Cal. 447; Fatheree v. Fletcher, 31
ents claim title, was the owner of a lifeinterest in the premises, and is presumed Miss. 265 ; Fearn v. Shiley, 31 Miss.
by law to have been in possession two 301 ; Caldwel v. Black, 5 Ired. (N.
years before he purchased a quit-claim C.) L. 463; M3cLean v. Jackson, 12 Id.
deed of the petitioner's mortgagee. And .149 ; 1cLean v. M1oore, 6 Jones (N.
if Cannon was in possession of the C.) L. 520; Jones v. Reese, 6 Rich.
(S. C ) 132.
premises as owner of a life-estate therein
And how the wife joining with her
at the time he purchased a quit-claim
from the mortgagee, it is necessary to husband in a mortgage-deed can make
sbov some act of foreclosure other than any difference beyond giving the mortthe mere purchase of the quit-claim, in gagee a right to foreclose, we are unaorder to render the possession adverse ble to see. That the mortgagee has
to the petitioner's right in remainder. the right of foreclosure is indisputable,
The registration of a deed is not notice and a decree against the husband and
wire would have barred both: 6 B. Mon.
of its contents to any except subsequent
purchasers, unless made so by stat- (Ky.) 376. And this we think is all
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that the wife can have been held to have
consented to in joining with her husband
in the mortgage-deed. The applicability or non-applicability of the Statute
of Limitations depends on the capacity
or non-capacity of the defendant to sue,
and not on the existence or non-existence in her of a right of disposal:
F nk'houser v. Lanyhoph, 26 Mlo. 453.
But in Connecticut the only provision
in regard to the rights of married women
to sue or to be stied in their own names
relates to the contingency of their carrying on a separate business under their
own names; and in actions of eject-

ment the Connecticut statute allows five
years to a person after the removal of
disability, in which to bring suit, and
this provision may be said to apply
equally to a bill in equity to redeem ;
since equity acts upon the Statutes of
Limitations only from analogy and in
the case of a mortgage takes the analogy
from the ordinary limitation to rights
of entry and actions of ejectment:
Story's Equity Jurisprudence, U 64
a, 1028 a, and in this instance the petitioner seems to have brought her bill
within the five years.
L. C. R.

.supremne Court of Illinois.
PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO. v. SMITIL
A palace or sleeping-car is not an inn, nor is the company owning it subject
to the responsibilities as to traveller's baggage of an innkeeper at common law.
A traveller, who was being transported by a railroad company, to whom he had
paid a fare, took a berth in a sleeping-car attached to the train, but belonging to
a different company, for which lie paid an extra sum to the sleeping-car company.
While asleep lie was robbed of a large sum of money lie carried in his pocket.
Held, that the sleeping-car company was not liable, either as an innkeeper or as a
common carrier.

from Cook county.
This was an action brought by Chester M. Smith, appellee,
against the Pullman Palace Car Company, appellant, for the recovery of $1180, claimed to have been lost from a Pullman sleepingcar, under the following circumstances:
Appellee, starting from his home in Oconomowoc, Wis., for a
point in Missouri, south-west of St. Louis, for the purpose of buying horses and mules, purchased a ticket through to St. Louis, via
The Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway to Chicago, thence to St.
Louis, over the Alton and St. Louis Railway. He arrived at
Chicago about eight o'clock in the evening and bought from appellant a sleeping-car ticket from Chicago to East St. Louis, for
which he paid the sum of two dollars, and took a berth in the
Pullman car, which left Chicago for St. Louis, at nine o'clock P.
m. His money, $1180, was in an inside vest pocket, and when he
retired for the night, the vest was placed under his pillow; in
APPEAL
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the moaning he found the vest as he left it, but the money was
gone.
On behalf of the Pullman Palace Car Company, it appeared,
that they have no place to store valuables, and that their agents
are instructed to receive no parcels, valuables or money, and receive no pay for baggage, or valuables of any kind, but only to
take pay for the occupancy of the berths ; and that they do not
receive packages, valuables or money, from passengers on the car,
to take charge of; upon the back of their checks, which are given
when the tickets are taken up, is printed the following: "Wearing
apparel or baggage placed in the car, will be entirely at the owner's
risk." They receive into their cars only those who have a firstclass passage ticket, or a proper pass from the railroad company;
passengers receive their berths for a particular trip, and for a particular berth and car, paying in advance. The company has no
interest in the fare paid by the passenger to the railroad company
for transportation, and the railroad company has no interest in the
pricea paid the Pullman Palace Car Company for berths; the
latter receive pay for sleeping accommodations, none whatever for
transportation.
The court below gave the following instruction to the jury:
"If the jury believe from the evidence, that the plaintiff, while
sleeping in the defendant's car, on the trip from Chicago to Alton,
was robbed of a sum of money which he then had with him, then the
verdict should be in his favor for the sum of which he was so robbed, unless the same was greater than would be an ordinary and
reasonable sum for a traveller to carry with him for travelling
expenses only, upon such a journey as the plaintiff was then upon,
and his return home; in which case he should only recover such
ordinary and reasonable sum, to which the jury may, if they think
proper, add interest at six per cent. for fourteen months."
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for $277, upon
which judgment was rendered, to reverse which the Pullman Palace Car Company bring this appeal.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHELDON, J.-The instruction which the court gave, to the
jury, mide the company responsible as insurer for the safety of
the money, imposing upon it the severe liability of an innkeeper
or common carrier; and it is the position which appellee's counsel
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take, that the relation between the parties in this case was that
of innkeeper and guest, and that the liability of the company is
that of an innkeeper.
In order to ascertain whether the extraordinary responsibility
claimed here exists, it becomes important to inquire into the nature of inns and guests, where this liability was imposed by the
common law, and see whether the description properly applies
here. Kent, in defining an inn, says: "It must be a house,
kept open publicly, for the lodging and entertainment of travellers
in general, for a reasonable compensation. If a person lets lodgings only, and upon a previous contract, with every person who
comes, and does not afford entertainment for the public at large
indiscriminately, it is not a common inn :" 2 Kent Com. 595.
This is substantially the same definition as is given in all the books
upon the subject.
"But the keeper of a mere coffee-house, or private boarding or
lodging-house, is not an innkeeper in the sense of the law." 2
Kent Com. 596; Dansey v. IMichardson, 3 Ellis & BI. 144;
Holder v. Soulby, 8 C. B. N. S. 254; Kisten v. H-ildebrand, 9
B. Monroe 72. It must be a common inn, that is, an inn kept
for travelleis generally, and not merely for a short season of the
year, and for select persons who are lodgers. Story on Bailm.,
§ 475, and cases cited in note. The duty of innkeepers extends
chiefly to the entertaining and harboring of travellers, finding
them victuals and lodgings, and securing the goods and effects
of their guests; and, therefore, if one who keeps a common inn,
refuses either to receive a traveller as a guest into his house, or to
find him victuals or lodgings, upon his tendering him a reasonable
price for the same, he is not only liable to render damages for the
injury, in an action on the case, at the suit of the party grieved,
but also may be indicted and fined at the suit 6f the King. 3 Bac.
Ab., Inns and Ankeepers, C. The custody of the goods of his
guest is part and parcel of the innkeeper's contract to feed, lodge
and accommodate the guest, for a suitable reward: 2 Kent's Com.
592.
From the authorities already cited, it is manifest that this Pullman Palace Car falls quite short of filling the character of a
common inn, and the Pullman Palace Car Company that of an
innkeeper.
It does not, like the innkeeper, undertake to accommodate the
VOL. XXIV.-13
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boarding public, indiscriminately, with lodging and entertainment.
It only undertakes to accommodate a certain class, those "who have
already paid their fare, and are provided with a first-class ticket
entitling them to a ride to a particular place.
It does not undertake to furnish victuals and lodging, but lodging alone, as we understand. There is a dining car attached to
the train, as shown, but not owned by the Pullman Company, nor
run by them. It belongs to another company-the Chicago and
Alton Dining Car Association. Appellant, as we understand,
furnishes no accommodation whatever, save the use of the berth
and bed, and a place and conveniences for toilet purposes. We
would not have it implied, however, that even were these eating
accommodations furnished by appellant, it would vary our decision, but the not furnishing entertainment is a lack of one of tei
features of an inn.
The innkeeper is obliged to receive and care for all the goods
and property of the traveller, which he may choose to take with
him upon the journey; appellant does not receive pay for, nor
undertake to care for any property or goods whatever, and notoriously refused to do so. The custody of the goods of the traveller
is not, as in the case of the innkeeper, accessory to the principal
contract to feed, lodge and accommodate the guest for a suitable
reward, because no such contract is made.
The same necessity.does not exist here as in the case of a
-common inn. At the time when this custom of an innkeeper's
liability had origin, wherever the end of the day's journey of the
wayfaring traveller brought him, there he was obliged to stop for
the night, and intrust his goods and baggage into the custody of
the innkeeper.' But here the traveller was not compelled to accept
the additional comfort of a sleeping-car; he might have remained
in the ordinary car, and there were easy methods within his reach
by which both money and baggage could be safely transported.
On the train which bore him, were a baggage and an express car,
and there was no necessity of imposing this duty and liability on
appellant.
It ,cannot be supposed that any such measure of duty or liability
attached to appellant, as is declared in the quotation cited from
Bacon's Abridgment, to belong to an innkeeper. The accommodation furnished appellee was in accordance with an express contract, entered into when he bought his berth ticket at Chicago,
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which was for the use of a specified couch from Chicago to St.
Louis, and appellant did not render a service made mandatory by
law, as in the case of an innkeeper.
But if it should be deemed, that on'principle merely, this company would be required to take as much care of the goods of a
lodger, as an innkeeper of those of a guest, the same may be said
with reference to the keeper of a boarding-house, or of a lodginghouse. In Dansey v. Richardson, supra, where the innkeeper's
liability was refused to be extended to a boarding-house keeper,it
was said by COLERIDGE, J. : "The liability of the innkeeper, as indeed other incidents to his position, do not, however, stand on mere
reason, but on custom, growing out of a state of society no longer
existing." In Holder Y. Soulby, supra, where it was held the law
imposed no duty upon a lodging-house keeper, to take due care of
the goods of a lodger, Calyc's case, 8 Co. Rep. 32, was designated
as fonsfiris, upon this subject, where it was expressly xesolved,
that though an innkeeper is responsible for the safety of the goods
of a guest, a lodging-house keeper is not. And in Parker v.
Flint, 12 Mod. 255: "If," says Lord HOLT, "one come to an
inn, and make a previous contract for lodging for a set time, and
do not eat or drink there, he is no guest, but a lodger, and as such,
is not under the innkeeper's protection ; but if he eat or drink
there, it is otherwise ; or if he pay for his diet there, though he
do not take it there."
The peculiar liability of the innkeeper is one of great rigor, and
should not be extended beyond its proper limits. We are satisfied
that there is no precedent, oi principle, for the imposition of such
a liability upon appellant.
Appellant is not liable as a carrier. It made no contract to
carry. Appellee was being carried by the railroad company, and
if appellant was a carrier, it would not be liable for the loss in this
case, because the money was not delivered into the possession or
custody of appellant, which is essential to its liability as carrier:
Towner v. The Utica 4- Schenectady Railroad Company, 7 Hill
47. In vol. 2, Redf. Am. Railroad Cases 138, it is said: "But
it has never been claimed that the passenger carrier is responsible
for the acts of pickpockets at their stations, or upon steamboats
and railway carriages."
It would be unreasonable to make the company responsible for
the loss of money which was never intrusted to its custody at all,

PULLMXN PALACE CAR CO. v. SMITH.

of which it had no information, and which the owner had concealed
upon his own person. The exposure to the hazard of lialility for
losses by collusion for pretended claims of loss where there would
be no means of disproof, would make the responsibility claimed a
fearful one. Appellee assumed the exclusive custody of his money,
adopted his own measures for its safe-keeping, by himself, and,
we think, his must be the responsibility of its loss.
We hold the instruction to be erroneous, and the judgment of
the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded.
It seems clear that the exceedingly
severe liabilities and duties of an innkeeper at common law cannot be imposed upon the owners of palace cars
attached to railway trains in this country. There are, it is true, some points
of resemblance between an innkeeper
and an operator or owner of a sleepingcar, or between a guest at an inn and
the occupant of a berth in a sleepingcar; and these resemblances might furnish reasons why some limited liability
should be placed upon these companies
by the courts, or if that is not possible,
in the absence of any general principle
of law which can be extended to meet the
the case, then by the legislature. Such,
for instance, as to hold the companies
responsible for any theft or wrongful act
of their servants, though done out of
the line of the servants' regular employment.
The points of dissimilarity between
the two classes of cases are fully and
forcibly set forth in the opinion of the
court in the principal case, and very
properly formed the basis of their decision.
The courts both in England and America have uniformly and positively refused to extend the rule of the liability
of an innkeeperbeyond the narrow limits
which confined it at common law. The
Roman law placed a lighter burden upon
the keeper of an inn, holding him liable
for the loss of the goods of a guest only
in case the goods were delivered to the
innkeeper, and put under his custody,

except in cases where it was proved that
the loss was caused by other guests or
by the servants of tl4e inn : Pothier,
Trait de Dp6t, n. 79 ; Story on Bailinent, § 468.
The legislatures of some of the states
have shown the same tendency as the
courts in restricting the liabilities of
innkeepers, and have brought the law in
this respect nearer to the rule of the
Roman law. Thus, in Pennsylvania,
the Act of 7th May 1855, enacts that
whenever an innkeeper provides a secure safe for the safe-keeping of valuables, an:d gives proper notice thereof,
he shall be liable to his guests only for
the loss of such amounts of money, and
such articles of baggage, &c., as it is
usual and prudent for a man to retain
in his room or about his person. Similar statutes have been passed in New
York and some other states.
It may be of interest to cite some
cases, in addition to those referred to in
the principal case, to show more fully to
what kipnd of cases the rule of an innkeeper's liability has been extended.
The reason of the rule has been stated
by Sir WILLIAM JONES as follows :
" Rigorous as the law in relation to

innkeepers may seem, and hard as it
may actually be in one or.two particular
instances, it is founded on the great
principle of public utility,-to which all
private considerations ought to yield ;
for travellers who must be numerous in
a rich and commercial country, are
obliged to rely almost implicitly on the

PULLMAN PALACE CAR CO. v. SMITIL
good faith of innhollders, whose education and morals arc usually none of the
best, and who might have frequent opportunities of associating with ruillans and
pilfcrers, while the injured guest could
seldon or never obtain legal proof of
such combinations, or even of their negligence, if no actual fraud had been
committed by them :" Jones on Bailments 95. 96.
InIIifu
q! v. If lI;, 9 Humpli. 748,
the court said : I"A passenger or wayfaring man may be an entire stranger.
lie mu.t put up and lodge at the inn to
which his day's journey may bring him.
It is therefore important that he should
be protected bv the most stringent rules
of law, enforcing the liability of an
innkeeper." See also Berkshire Moollen
Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417.
In Cromccll v. Stelhens, 2 Daly 15,
the court, in a very learned opinion by
DALY, P. J., said : "A mere lodginghouse, in which no provision is made
for zupplying lodgers with their meals,
wants one of the essential requisites of
an inn." And further, that an inn is
a house where all who conduct themselves properly, &c., are received, and
while there are supplied at reasonable
charge with lodging, meals and services.
In Carpenterv. Taylors, I Hilton 193,
the court held that a restaurant could
not be considered an inn, and said that
"on the contrary, as the customs of
society change and the modes of living
are altered, the law as established under different circumstances must yield
.and be accommodated to such changes."
In another case in the same state, a
distinction was drawn between innkeepers and boarding-house keepers:
lVintermute v. Clarke, 5 Samd. 245.
In Benner v. Jrellburn, 7 Ga. 296,
the court went so far as to hold that a
public hotel at a watering-place, possessing a medicinal spring and open
during the summer and fall for visitors

in search of health or pleasure, was of
the nature of a boarding-lhouse and not
of a tavern or house.of entertainment.
So a person living at EHpsom and lodging ,trangers for drinking the waters in
the season, was held not to be an innkeeper against whom an action would
lie for refusing to entertain a guest:
5 Bac. Abr. 228.
In Lyon Y. Smith, 1 Morris 184, the
court were of opinion that a person who
does not hol'd himself out as an innkeeper, but entertains travellers occasionally for pay, is not subject to the
liabilities of an innkeeper.
The result of all the cases seems to
be, as above stated, that the rule will not
be carried beyond the narrow limits
within which it was originally confined,
not even to cover the case of a boardinghouse keeper. It would evidently be
against all time authorities on the subject to bring the appellants in the principal case within this rule.
There
seems to be no other ground than the
one above discussed, upon.which the
appellee in this ease could recover. In
the absence of delivery of the money to
the appellant.s agent or servant, there
could, as the court in the principal ease
held, be no recovery for the loss. See
Story Bailm., 532, and cases in n. 4.
With regard to the notice which it
seems to have been assumed that the
appellee had received, that the company
appellants would not be responsible for
baggage, &c., it is doubtfttl whether this
would of itself, even though brought
home to the occupant of a berth, be
enough to remove a liability otherwise
resting upon the company. It has been
held in the case of innkeepers that such
notice did not affect the duties and liabilities of the innkeepers :"Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ills. 302 : Pro.filet v. Hall,
14 La. Ann. 524. Though an inference
to the contrary may be drawn from
Berkshire, &5-c., Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush.
417.
F. R.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE r. MERCHANTS' NATIONAL
BANK.
'here the holder of a time-draft, with accompanying bills of lading, sends them
to an agent with no special instructions to hold the bills of lading, the agent is
authorized to surrender the bills to the drawee on the latter's acceptance of the
drafts.
It does not make any difference that the drafts are sent to the agent " for collection." That instruction merely rebuts the inference of the agent's ownership of
the draft.
Bills of lading, though transferable by endorsement, are only quasi negotiable;
and the endorsee does not acquire the right to change the agreement between the
shipper and his vendee.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STRONG, J.-The fundamental question in this case is whether
a bill of lading of merchandise deliverable to order, when attached
to a time-draft, and forwarded with the draft to an agent for collection, without any special instructions, may be surrendered to
the drawee on his acceptance of the draft, or whether the agent's
duty is to hold the bill of lading after the acceptance, for the payment. It is true there are other questions growing out of portions
of the evidence, as well as one of the findings of the jury, but they
are questions of secondary importance. The bills of exchange
were drawn by cotton brokers residing in Memphis, Tennessee, on
Green & Travis, merchants residing in Boston. They were drawn
on account of cotton shipped by the brokers to Boston, invoices of
which were sent to Green & Travis, and bills of lading were taken
by the shippers, marked in case of two of the shipments "to
order," and in case of the third shipment marked "for Green &
Travis, Boston, Mass." There was an agreement between tho
shippers and the drawees that the bill of lading should be surrendered on acceptance of the bills of exchange, but the existence
of this agreement was not known by the Bank of Memphis when
that bank discounted the drafts and took with them the bills of
lading endorsed by the shippers. We do not propose to inquire
now whether the agreement, under these circumstances, ought to
have any effect upon the decision of the case. Conceding that
bills of lading are negotiable, and that their endorsement and delivery pass the title of the shippers to the property specified in
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them, and, therefore, that the plaintiffs when they discounted the
drafts and took the endorsed railroad receipts or bills of lading,
became the owners of the cotton; it is still true they sent the bills
with the drafts to their correspondents in New York, the Metropolitan Bank, with no instructions to hold them after acceptance.
And the Metropolitan Bank transmitted them to the defendants in
Boston, with no other instruction than that the bills were sent "for
collection." What, then, was the duty of the defendants? Obviously it was first to obtain the acceptance of the bills of exchange.
But Green & Travis were not bound to accept, even though they
had ordered the cotton, unless the bills of lading were delivered to
them contemporaneously with their acceptance. Their agreement
with their vendors, the shippers, secured them against such an
obligation. Moreover, independent of this agreement, the drafts
upon their face showed that they had been drawn upon the cotton
covered by the bills of lading. Both the plaintiffs and their agents,
the defendants, were thus informed that the bills were not drawn
upon any funds of the drawers in the bands of Green & Travis,
and that they were expected to be paid out of the proceeds of the
cotton. But how could they be paid out of the proceeds of the
cotton if the bills of lading were withheld? Withholding them,
therefore, would defeat alike the expectation and the intent of the
drawers of the bills. Hence, were there nothing more, it would
seem that a drawer's agent to collect a time-bill, without further
instructions, would not be justified in refusing to surrender the
property against which the bill was drawn, after its acceptance,
and thus disable the acceptor from making payment out of the property designated for that purpose.
But it seems to be a natural inference, indeed a necessary implication, from a time-draft accompanied by a bill of lading endorsed in blank, that the merchandise (which in this case was
cotton) specified in the bill was sold on credit, to be paid for by
the accepted draft, or that the draft is a demand for an advance
on the shipment, or that the transaction is a consignment to be
sold by the drawee on account of the shipper. It is difficult to
conceive of any other meaning the instruments can have. If so, in
the absence of any express arrangement to the contrary, the acceptor, if a purchaser, is clearly entitled to the possession of the
goods on his accepting the bill and thus giving the vendor a completed contract for payment. This would not be doubted if, in-
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stead of an acceptance, he had given a promissory note for the
goods, payable at the expiration of the stipulated credit. " In such
a case it is clear the vendor could not retain possession of the subject of the sale after receiving the note for the price. The idea
of a sale on credit is that the vendee is to have the thing sold, on
his assumption to pay, and bWfore actual payment. Thre consideration of the sale is the note. But an acceptor of a bill of exchange
stands in the same position as the maker of a promissory note. If
he has purchased on credit and is denied possession until he shall
make payment, the transaction ceases to be what it was intended,
and is converted into a cash sale. Everybody understands that a
sale on credit entitles the purchaser to immediate possesgion of the
property sold, unless there be a special agreement that it may be
retained by the vendor, and such is the well-recognised doctrine
of the law. The reason for this is that very often, and with merchants generally, the thing purchased is needed to provide means
for the deferred payment of the price. Hence, it is justly inferred
that the thing is intended to pass at once within the control of the
purchaser. It is admitted that a different arrangement may be
stipulated for. Even in a credit sale it may be agreed by the
parties that the vendor shall retain the subject until the expiration
of the credit, as a security for the payment of the sum stipulated.
But if so, the agreement is special, something superadded to an
ordinary contract of sale on credit, the existence of which is not
to be presumed. Therefore, in a case where the drawing of a timedraft against a consignment raises the implication that the goods
consigned have been sold on credit, the agent to whom the draft
to be accepted and the bill of lading to be delivered have been entrusted cannot reasonably be required to know, without instruction,
that the transaction is not what it purports to be. He has no
right to assume and act on the assumption that the vendee's term
of credit must expire before he can have the goods, and that he is
bound to accept the draft, thus making himself absolutely responsible for the sum.named therein, and relying upon the vendor's
engagement to deliver at a future time. This would be treating
a sale on credit as a mere executory contract to sell at a subsequent date.
And, if the inference to be drawn from a time-draft accompazied
by a bill of lading is not that it evidences a. credit sale, but a request for advances on the credit of the consignment, the consequence
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is the same. Perhaps it is even more apparent. It plainly is that
the acceptance is notasked on the creditof the drawer of the draft,
but on the faith of the consignment. The drawee is not asked to
accept on the mere assurance that the drawer will at a future day
deliver the goods to reimburse the advances. Ie is askel to accept
in reliance on a security in hand. To refuse to him thatsecurity is
to deny him the basis of his requested acceptance. It is remitting
him to the personal credit of the drawer alone. An agent for collection having the draft and attached bill of lading cannot be permitted, by declining to surrender the bill of lading on the acceptance of the bill, to disappoint the obvious intentions of the parties,
and deny to the acceptor a substantial right which by his contract
is assured to him. The same remarks are applicable to the case
of an implication that the merchandise was shipped to be sold on
account of the shipper.
Nor can it make any difference that the draft with the bill of
lading las been sent to an agent (as in this case) "for collection."
That in-truction means simply to rebut the inference from the endorsement that the agent is the owner of the draft. It indicates
an agency: S'ieenoy v. Baster, 1 Wall. 166. It does not conflict
with the plain inference from the draft and accompanying, bill of
lading that the former was a request for a promise to pay at a
future time for goods sold on credit, or a request to make advances
on the faith of the described consignment, or a request to sell on
account of the shipper. By such a transmission to the agent he
is instructed to collect the money mentioned in the drafts, not to
collect the bill of lading. And the first step in the collection is
procuring acceptance of the draft. The agent is, therefore, authorized to do all which is necessary to obtaining such acceptance.
If the drawee is not bound to accept without the surrender to him
of the consigned property or of the bill of lading, it is the duty of
the agent to make that surrender, and if le fails to perform this
duty, and in consequence thereof acceptance be refused, the drawer
and endorser of the draft are discharged : 2Iason v. Hunt, 1 Doug.
297.
The opinions we have suggested are supported by other very
rational considerations.

In the absence of special agreement,

what is the consideration for acceptance of a time-draft drawn
against merchandise consigned? Is it the merchandise, or is it
the promise of the consignor to deliver ? If the latter, the conVOL. XXIV.-14
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signor may be wholly irresponsible. If the bill of lading be to his
order, he may, after acceptance of the draft, endorse it t6 a stranger, and thus wholly withdraw the goods from any possibility of
their ever coming to the hands of the acceptor. Is, then, the
acceptanc9 a mere purchase of. the promise of the drawer ? If so,
why are the goods forwarded before the time designated for payment ? They are as much after shipment under the control of the
drawer as they were before. Why incur the expense of storage
and of insurance ? And if the draft with the goods or with the
bill of lading be sent to a bank for collection, as in the case before
us, can it be incumbent upon the bank to take and maintain custody of the property sent during the interval between the acceptance and the time fixed for payment ? (The shipments in this
case were hundreds of bales of cotton.) Meanwhile, though it be
a twelvemonth, and no matter what the fluctuations in the market
value of the goods may be, are the goods to be withheld from sale
or use ? Is the drawee to run the risk of falling prices with no
ability to sell till the draft is due ? If the consignment be of perishable articles, such as peaches, fish, butter, eggs, &c., are they to
remain in a warehouse until the term of credit shall expire? And
who is to pay the warehouse charges ? Certainly not the drawees.
If they are to be paid by the vendor, or one who has succeeded
to the place of the vendor by endorsement of the draft and bill
of lading, he fails to obtain the price for wh'ich the goods were
sold.
That the holder of a bill of lading, who has become such by
endorsement, and by discounting the draft drawn against the consigned property, succeeds to the situation of the shipper, is not to
be doubted. He has the same right to demand acceptance of the
accompanying bill, and no more. If the shipper cannot require
acceptance of the draft without surrendering the bill of lading,
neither can the holder. Bills of lading, though transferable by
endorsement, are only quasi negotiable: 1 Parsons on Shipping
192; Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray-297 a. The endorser does not
acquire a right to change the agreement between the shipper and
his vendee. He cannot impose oblihtions or deny advantages to
the drawee of the bill of exchange drawn against the shipment
which were not in the power of the draw
and consignor. But
were this not so, in the case we have nowik %and,the agents for
collection of the drafts were not informed, eter by the drafts
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themselves or by any instructions they received, or in any other
way, that the ownership of the drafts and bills of lading was not
still in the consignors of the cotton. On the contrary, as the
drafts were sent "for collection," they might well conclude that
the collection was to be made for the drawers of the bills. We do
not, therefore, perceive any force in the argument pressed upon us
that .the Bank of 'Memphis was the purchaser of the drafts drawn
upon Green & Travis, and the holder of the bills of lading by
endorsement of the shippers.
It is urged that the bills of lading were contracts collateral to
the bills of exchange which the bank discounted, and that when
transferred they became a security for the principal obligation,
namely, the contract evidenced by the bills of exchange; for the
wtole contract, and not a part of it, and that the whole contract
required not only the acceptance, but the payment of the bills.
The argument assumes the very thing to be proved, to wit: that
the transfer of the bills of lading were made to secure the payment
of the drafts. The opposite of this, as we have seen, is to be
inferred from the bills of lading and the time-drafts drawn against
the consignment, unexplained by express stipulations. The bank,
when discoun'ting the drafts, was bound to know that the drawers
on their acceptance were entitled to the cotton, and, of course, to
the evidences of title to it. If so, they knew that the bills of lading could not be a security for the ultimate payment of the drafts.
Paynent of the drafts by the drawees was no part of the contract
when the discounts were made. The bills of exchange were then
incomplete. They needed accceptance. They were discounted in
the expectation that they would be accepted, and that thus the bank
would obtain additional promissors. The whole purpose of the transfers of the bills of lading to the bank may, therefore, well have been
satisfied when the additional names were secured by acceptance, and
when the drafts thereby became completed bills of exchange. We
have already seen that whether the drafts and accompanying bills of
lading evidenced sales on credit, or requests for advancements on
the cotton consigned, or bailments to be sold on the consignor's
account, the drawees were ntitled to the possession of the cotton
before they could be required to accept, and that if they had declined to accept because possession was denied to them concurrently with their acceptance, the effect would have been to dischargo the drawers and endorsers of the drafts. The demand of
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acceptance, coupled with a claim to retain the bills of lading,
would have been an insufficient demand. Surely, the Purpose of
putting the bills of lading into the hands of the bank was to secure
the completion of the drafts by obtaining additional names upon
them, and not to discharge the drawers and endorsers, leaving the
bank only a resort to the cbtton pledged.
It is said that if the plaintiffs were not entitled to retain the
bills of lading as a security for the payment of the drafts after
their acceptance, their only security for payment was the undertaking of the drawees, who were without means, and the promise
of the acceptors, of whose standing and credit they knew nothing.
This may be true, though they did know that the acceptors had
previously promptly met their acceptances, which were numerous
and large in amount. But if they did not choose to rely solely on
the responsibility of the acceptors and drawers, they had it in their
power to instruct their agents not to deliver the cotton until the
drafts were paid. Such instructions are not infrequently given in
case of time-drafts against consignments, and the fact that they
are'given tends to show that in the commercial community it is
understood, without them, agents for co.llection would be obliged
to give over the bills of lading on acceptance of the draft. Such
instructions would be wholly unnecessary, if it is the duty of such
agents to hold the bills of lading as securities for the ultimate payment.
Thus far we have considered the question without reference to
any other authority than that of reason. In addition to this, we
think the decisions of the courts and the language of many eminent
judges accord with the opinions we avow. In the case of Lanfear
v. Blossom, 1 La. Ann. Rep. 148, the very point was decided,
after an elaborate argument both by the counsel and by the court.
It was held that "where a bill of exchange drawn on a shipment,
and payable a certain number of days after sight, is sold, with the
bill of lading appended to it, the holder of the bill of exchange
cannot, in the absence of proof of any local usage to the contrary,
or of the imminent insolvency of the drawee, require the latter to
accept the bill of exchange, except on the delivery of the bill of
lading; and when, in consequence of the refusal of the holder to
deliver' the bill of lading, acceptance is refused and the bill protested, the protest will be considered as made without cause, the
drawee not having been in default, and the drawer will be dis-
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This decision is not to be distinguished in its essential
charged."
features from the opinions we have expressed. A judgment in the
same case to the same effect was given in the Commercial Court
of Ne.v Orleans by Judge WATTS, who supported it by a very
convincing opinion:. 14 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine 264. These
decisions were made in 1845 and 1846. In other courts, also, the
question has arisen, what is the duty of a collecting bank to which
thne-drafts, with bills of lading attached, have been sent for collection ? and the decisions have been that the agent is bound to
deliver the bills of lading to the acceptor on his acceptance. In
the case The Irisconsin Marine & Fire Insurance Gompany v.
The Bank of British ANorth America, 21 Upper Canada Queen's
Bench Reps. 284, decided in 1861, where it appeared that the
plaintiff, a bank at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, had sent to the defendants, a bank at Toronto, for collection, a bill drawn by A., at
Milwaukee, on B. at Toronto, payable forty-five days after date,
together with a bill of-lading, endorsed by A., for certain wheat
sent from Milwaukee to Toronto, it was held that, in the absence
of any instructions to the contrary, the defendants were not bound
to retain the bill of lading until payment of the draft by B., but
were right in giving it up to him on obtaining his acceptance.
This case was reviewed, in 1863, in the Court of Error and Appeals,
and the judgment affirmed: 2 Upper Canada Error and Appeal,
Reps. 282. See also Goodenough v. The City Bank, 10 Upper
Canada Com. Pleas 51; O7ark v. The Bank of Montreal, 18
Grant's Ch. 211.
There are also many expressions of opinion by the most respectable courts, which, though not judgments, and, therefore, not
authorities, are of weight in determining what are the implications of such a state of facts as this case exhibits. In Shepherd
v. Harrison, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. 493, Lord COCKBURN said:
"The authorities are equally good to show, when the consignor
sends the bill of lading to an agent in this country to be by him
handed over to the consignee, and accompanies that with bills of
exchange to be accepted by the consignee," that that I"indicates
an intention that the handing over of the bill of lading and the acceptance of the bill or bills of exchange, should be concurrent parts
of one and the same transaction." The case subsequently went to
the House of Lords (5 H. L. 133), where Lord CAIRNS said: "If
they (the drawees), accept the cargo and bill of lading, and accept
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the bill of exchange drawn against the cargo, the object of those
who shipped the goods is obtained. They have got the bill of exchange in return for the cargo ; they discount, or use it as they
think proper, and they are virtually paid for the goods." In
Coventry v. Gladtone, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 493, it was declared by
the Vice-Chancellor that ' the parties shipping the goods from
Calcutta, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, did
give their agents in England full authority, if they thought fit, .to
pass over the bill of lading to the person who had accepted the bill
of exchange" drawn against the goods and attached to the bill of
lading, and it was ruled that an alleged custom of trade to retain
the bill of lading until payment of the accompanying draft on account of the consignment was exceptional, and was not established
as being the usual course of business. In S..uhart et al. v. Hall
et al., 39 Md. 590, which was a case of a time-draft, accompanied
by a bill of lading, hypothecated by the drawer, both for the acceptance and the payment of the draft, and when the drawers bad
been authorized to draw against the cargo shipped, it was said by
the court "under their contract with the defendants the latter
were authorized to draw only against the cargo of wheat to be
shipped by the Ocean Belle, and they i(the drawees) were, therefore, not bound to accept without the delivery to them of the bill
of lading." See also the language of the judges in Gurney v.
Behrend, 3 E. & B1. 622; Marine Bank v. Wright, 48 N. Y.
1; Cayuga Bank v. Daniels, 47 N. Y. 631.
We have been unable to discover a single decision of any court
holding the opposite doctrines. Those to which we have been referred as directly in point, determine nothing of the kind. Gilbert v. Guignon, Law Rep. 8 Ch. App. 16, was a contest between
two holders of several bills of lading of the same shipment. The
question was which had priority. It was not at all whether the
drawee of a time-draft against a consignment has not a right to
the bill of lading when he accepts. The drawer bad accepted
without requiring the surrender of the first endorsed bill of lading,
and the Lord Chancellor, while suggesting a query whether he
might not have declined to accept unless the bills of lading were
at the same time delivered up to him, remarked, "if he was content th6y should remain in the hands of the holder, it was exactly
the same thing as if he had previously and originally authorized
that course of proceeding, and that (according to the Chancellor's
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view) was actually what had happened in the case." Nothing,
therefore, was decided respecting the rights of the holder of a timedraft, to which a. bill of lading is attached, as against the drawee.
The contest was wholly inter aliospartes.
Seymour v. Megwton, 105 Mass. 272, was the case of an acceptance of the draft, without the presentation of the bill of lading.
In . that respect it was like Gilbert v. Guignon. No question,
however, was made in regard to this. The acceptor became insolvent before the arrival of the goods, and all that was decided was
that, under the circumstances, the jury would be authorized to find
that the lien of the shippers had not been discharged. It was a
case of .stoppage in transitu. It is true that, in delivering the
opinion of the court, Chief Justice CHAPMAN said, "the obvious
purpose was that there should be no delivery to the vendee till the
draft should be paid." But the remark was purely obiter, uncalled for by anything in the case. Neweomb v. The Boston and
Lowell Railroad Corporation,115 Mass. 230, was also the case
of acceptance of sight-drafts without requiring the delivery of the
attached bills of lading, and the contest was not between the holder
of the drafts and the acceptor. It was between the holder of the
drafts with the bills of lading and the carrier. We do not perceive that the case has any applicability to the question we have
now under consideration. True, there, as in the case of Seymour
v. Newton, it was remarked by the judge who delivered the opinion, "the railroad receipts were manifestly intended to be held
by the collecting bank as security for the acceptance and payment
of the drafts." Intended by whom? Evidently the court meant
by the drawees and the bank, for it is immediately added: ' they
continued to be held by the bank after the drafts had been accepted by Chandler & Co. (the drawees), and until, at Chandler &
Co.'s request, they were paid by the plaintiff, and the receipts,
with the drafts still attached, were endorsed and delivered by
Chandler & Co. to the plaintiff." In Stollenwork et al. v. Thatcher
et al., 115 Mass. 224 (the only other case cited by the defendants
in error as in point on this question), there were instructions to the
agent to deliver the bill of lading only on payment of the draft,
and it was held that the special agent, thus instructed, could not
bind his principal by a delivery of the bill without such payment.
Nothing was decided that is pertinent to the present case. In
Bank v. Bayley, reported in the same volume, p. 228, where the

112

NAT. B'K OF COMMERCE v. MERCHANTS' NAT. WK.

instructions given to the collecting agent were, so far as it appears,
only that the drafts and bills of lading were remitted for bollection,
and where acceptance was refused, Chief Justice GRAY said "the
drawees of the draft attached to each of the bills of lading were not
entitled to the bill of lading or the property described therein, except upon acceptanceof the -draft." It is but just to say, however,
that this remark, as well as those made by the same judge in the
other Massachusetts cases cited, was aside from the decision of the
court.
After this review of the authorities cited, as in point, in the very
elaborate argument for the defendants in error, we feel justified in
saying that, in our opinion, no respectable case can be found in
which it has been decided that when a time-draft has been drawn
against a consignment to order, and has been forwarded to an agent
for collection with the bill of lading attached, without any further
instructions, the agent is not justified in delivering over the bill
of lading on the acceptance of the draft.
If this, however, were doubtful, the doubt ought to be resolved
favorably to the agent. In the case in hand, the Bank of Commerce having accepted the agency to collect, was bound only to
reasonable care and diligence in the discharge of its assumed duties:
Warren v. The Suffolk Bank, 10 Cush. 582. In case of doubt,
its best judgment was all the principal had a right to require. If
the absence of specific instructions left it uncertain what was to be
done further than to procure acceptances of the drafts, and to
receive payment when they fell due, it was the fault of the principal. If the consequence was a loss, it would be most unjust to
cast the loss on the agent.
Applying what we have said to the instruction given by the
learned judge of the Circuit Court to the jury, it is evident that
he was in error. Without discussing in detail the several assignments of error, it is sufficient for the necessities of this case, to say
it was a mistake to charge the jury as they were charged, that "in
the absence of any consent of the owner of a bill of exchange, other
than such as may be implied from the mere fact of sending ' for
collection' a bill of exchange with a bill of lading pasted or attached
to a bill of exchange, the bank so receiving the two papers for collection *ould not be authorized to separate the bill of lading from
the bill of exchange and surrender it before the bill of exchange
was paid." And again, there was error in the following portion
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of the charge: "But if the Metropolitan Bank merely sent to the
defendant bank the bills of exchange with the bills of lading attached
for collection, with no other instructions, either expressed or implied
from the past relations of the parties, they would not be so justified
in surrendering (the bills of lading) on acceptance only." The
Bank of Commerce can be held liable to the owners of the drafts
for a breach of duty in surrendering the bills of lading on acceptaice of the drafts only after special instructions to retain the bills
until payment of the acceptances. The drafts were all time-drafts.
One, it is true, was drawn at sight, but in Massachusetts such
drafts are entitled to grace.
What we have said renders it unnecessary to notice the other
assignments of error.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the record is
remitted, with directions to award a new trial.

Supreme Judicial Court of New famphire.
WIIIPPLE v. GILES.
The contract of a married woman to pay for services of an attorney in prosecuting a libel for divorce against her husband is not binding.
A married woman cannot bind herself by a mere personal contract so that an
action can be maintained against her after the coverture has ceased, nor will such
contract be implied against her by reason of services rendered during her
covertare.

AssuMPSIT.-The plaintiff was employed by the defendant, as
an attorney-at-law, to procure for her a divorce on the alleged
ground of extreme cruelty, and it was for services so rendered that
this suit was brought. After the testimony had been taken, the
proceedings for divorce were abandoned by her, and she directed
the plaintiff to proceed no further, and the defendant thereafter
lived with her husband as his wife until his death some year or
two after. Since the death of the husband this suit was brought.
If the plaintiff could maintain his action, he was to have judgment
for the amount of his claim and taxable costs, otherwise a nonsuit
was to be entered.
LADD, J.-It is settled that the common-law disability of a
married woman to bind herself by contract, is not removed by
statute in this state, except so far as regards her contracts respecting property which she holds in her own right. That was so decided in Bailey v. Pearson,29 N. H. 77, upon the statute of 1846,
VOL. XXIV.-15
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which was not materially different from Gen. Stats., ch. 164, sect.
13, and has been repeatedly reaffirmed since. This seehs to me
quite decisive of the present case. There is no just sense in which
a contract by a married woman for the services of an attorney in
procuring for her a divorce, can be said to be a contract respecting her separate property, even if she had such property, which
does not here appear. I think the action cannot be maintained.
CUSHING, C. J.-"Assumpsit upon a mere personal contract
made during coverture will not lie against a married woman,
whether her husband be joined in the suit or not, unless such contract was made in respect to property held by the wife to her sole
and separate use :" Carleton v. Haywood, 49 N. H. 314.
"Where afeme covert, holding property under the Act of 1846,.
signed a promissory note during the coverture, which did not
appear to have bedn given on account of any contract growing out
of the property-held, that it could not be recovered :" Bailey v.
Pearson,29 N. R. 77. Substantially the same doctrine is held in
Eaton v. George, 40 N. H. 258; see, also, Brown v. Glines, 42
N. H. 160; Eaton v. George, 42 Id. 375; Ames v. Poster, Id. 881;
Shannon v. Uanney, 44 Id. 592; Leach v. Noyes, 45 Id. 364.
It appears from the cases cited, that, independently of statutory
exceptions, it is generally true that a married woman cannot be
bound by any contract expressly made by her during her coverture, or implied against her by reason of matters arising during
the same time. I see nothing in the facts stated in this agreed
case to take it out of the operation of the general rule in the case
of Morris v. Palmer, 89 N. H. 123, where it was held t.hat the
services and expenses of an attorney employed by a married
woman were necessaries; it was also held that the husband, and
not the wife, was liable for them. It appears to me, therefore,
that according to the agreement, there must be judgment of nonsuit.
SMIT.,
J.-At common law the contract of a feme covert, with
certain very limited exceptions, was void, and no action could be
maintained thereon against her.
Under Gen. Stats., ch. 164, sect. 18, she has the same rights
and remedies in relation -to any property which she holds in her
own riglit, and may sue and be sued in her own name upon any
contract by her made or for any wrong by her done in respect to
such property, as if she were unmarried. The statute does not,
either in terms or by implication, apply to any contracts made by

